Continued from Part 3.
VIGILANTES
At the time of the attacks on various Ogoni villages, all Ogoni people were nervous and there was considerable fear. Each village called out its youth and ordered the to organize the defence of the village. The youths called themselves “Vigilantes”. It was a desperate measure, since the youths were not armed. But it was important psychologically. However, when the armed attacks on the villages stopped, the vigilantes became a social problem.
Instances of “witch hunting” in which Ogoni youth were encouraged to go into villages to search for and either extort money from or actually kill suspected “wizards” were reported. We were terribly appalled by this barbarism and fought the development with our usual vigour, issuing letters of warning to all village heads and holding rallies to educate the people as to the legal consequences of lawlessness and murder. Dr. Leton and his groups did not condemn this “witch hunt” at any time, which made us believe that they either initiated it or gave it their tacit support as a means of discrediting a MOSOP which they had abandoned. We succeeded in the end in stopping this barbaric practice.
A PEACE(?) ACCORD
The conspirators now turned tack. On October 4, 1993, they sprang a “Peace Conference” between the Andoni and the Ogoni, this time headed by Professor Elaigwu, of the National Council on intern-governmental Relations, who arrived mysteriously from Abuja and, in less than two days, fashioned an “accord”.
There were reasons to distrust the Elaigwu initiative. What had happened to the Claude Ake Committee? And what was the business of Shell which was conspicuously represented at the “Peace Conference”? Nor were the Andoni and Ogoni at war, except in the fevered brains of the Rivers State Security Council which was doing everything to mask the attack on the Ogoni through the Andoni border as a “communal clash”.
The new initiative was put to the test when I refused to sign the document which resulted from the meetings because I needed to have it approved by MOSOP’s Steering Committee and the Ogoni people. Presented to the Ogoni people, they declared two paragraphs which asked for a resumption of all economic activity in Ogoni as unacceptable.
In spite of the refusal of the Ogoni people to accept the proposal, Shell decided that there was an accord and returned to its oilfields in Ogoni, under the protection of Nigerian troops. The company ran into problems at its Korokoro oilfield on October 18, 1993 when it ordered troops to shoot and kill villagers who were alarmed at the renewed sight of Shell workers in the village. One man was shot dead and two others were wounded.
This fact, above all else, indicates Shell’s complicity in the state violence which has been visited on the Ogoni since April 1993. Shell is always there in the background even as it denies all participation. I believe, and not without reason, that the Company’s ready cash is always at play, goading officials to illegal, covert and overt actions.
A CHANGE OF GUARDS
With General Abacha’s seizure of power in November of 1993, Lt-Colonel Dauda Musa Komo, was appointed the Military Administrator of Rivers State. He did not arrive in Port Harcourt to assume duty until the 14th of December, 1993. The security mafia in Port Harcourt had a message waiting for him.
PORT HARCOURT WATERFRONT MAYHEM
On the 12th and 13th of December, right under the nose of the police, navy and army, the residences of Ogoni people at several waterfronts in Port Harcourt were targeted. Fifty-three Ogoni men, women and children were massacred and all buildings belonging to Ogoni people dynamited out of existence.
Confronted with the rubble upon his arrival, Lt-Colonel Komo did what was to be expected in the circumstances: he set up a Commission of Inquiry headed by a serving military officer, Major Paul Taiwo, to investigate the disturbances and make recommendations.
According to a leaked copy of the Inquiry Panel, the Commission came to a predictable conclusion:
In all the waterfronts where there was a mixture of ethnic groups, say Ogonis, Okrikas, Ibos, Yorubas etc., destruction of houses was really selective. Only the Ogoni houses were handpicked and destroyed… The evidence before the Commission suggests a situation in which one well-prepared party caught the other unsuspecting party sleeping in a series of attacks co-ordindated with military expertise and precision… The disturbances should not be described as a communal clash as it was nothing of the sort.
As to “strong allegations against MOSOP to the effect that MOSOP not only planned the disturbances but also directed Ogoni military operations during the disturbances”, the Commission said: The Commission wishes to point out that it has painstakingly investigated these allegations to try to establish a link between the disturbances and MOSOP but was unable to establish MOSOP’s involvement with the disturbances in the remotest possible way. The Commission therefore concludes that the allegations made against MOSOP are completely without foundation and are a clumsy attempt at shielding the real culprit by pointing fingers at innocent parties…The only involvement of MOSOP with the disturbances has been of a positive nature. This is because most of the Ogonis affected by the disturbances had communication difficulties and could not articulate their losses or experiences. Here MOSOP stepped in. It not only served as a rallying point for the aggrieved Ogonis but it also became a mouthpiece of these harassed and suffering people. MOSOP was able to compile a list of those affected — a list which the Commission found most invaluable in accomplishing its task.
The Commission refused to comment on “the attitude of the Nigeria Police before, during and after the crisis.” But it did disclose that when it asked the Police for a “comprehensive report of the disturbances”, it was given a report which appears to have been deliberately framed to give away as little information as possible.
I have dwelt at length on this report because it is the only official government investigation of the putative “communal clashes” organized by the State and Shell against the Ogoni people, and it clearly identifies the role of the security agencies, of MOSOP under my presidency, and of the State itself in the mayhem.
The report of the Commission was never published because even before the Commission finished its detailed and thorough inquiries, Lt-Col. Komo had been sucked into the Conspiracy and become its valued leader.
NEW MOVES AGAINST MOSOP AND THE OGONI
Although MOSOP made every effort to brief Lt.-Col. Komo, he took steps to humiliate MOSOP leaders and to provoke the Ogoni people. He arrested MOSOP Deputy President, Ledum Mitee and Steering Committee member, Dr. Owens Wiwa on 24th December, 1993 and sent soldiers to invade the venues of all activities — debates, lectures, symposia, exhibitions and church services — planned for the end of the United Nations Year of the World’s Indigenous Populations and which were to culminate in the celebration of Ogoni Day on 4th January, 1994. He placed me and my entire family under house arrest from the 2nd to the 5th of January, 1994.
MOSOP was able to read these provocative actions right and to convince the Ogoni people to keep calm and maintain the peace.
RIVERS STATE INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE
Following representation which we had regularly made to the new administration of General Abacha (Ledum Mitee and I met with General Diya, the Chief of General Staff and General Chris Alli, the Chief of Army Staff soon after they assumed office), a Ministerial Committee was sent by the federal government to tour the oil-bearing areas of the country. The Committee started their tour in Ogoni on the 19th of January, 1994.
No sooner had the team left Port Harcourt than Lt-Col. Komo, no doubt acting on the advice of the Security Council which he had inherited and which had commenced the aggression against the Ogoni people, constituted the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force which he placed under Major (now Lt.-Col.) Paul Okuntimo, a former course-mate of his at the Nigerian Defence Academy and who had, as Camp Commandant of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade in Port Harcourt, supervised all the earlier acts of aggression against the Ogoni people. He had personally carried out the cold-blooded murder committed under the eyes of Shell employees at Korokoro on 18th October, 1993.
The orders to the illegal and unprecedented Task Force were simple: “box in the Ogoni and subject them to the authority of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force.” Ogoni, in a small area, surrounded to the south by the Okrika and Andoni Ijaws, to the north by the Ndoki Igbos, and to the east by the Ibibios, was easy to so “box in”. Besides, the Ogoni were unarmed and it would be a goon force indeed that could not box them in easily. Besides, federal troops were already in Ogoni, at MOSOP’s invitation. It is pertinent that not a single Ogoni soldier or mobile policeman was ever allowed to serve in the Internal Security Task Force.
This is not the end of this statement. Due to the length of the statement, we have decided to publish it in series. Parts 5, and 6 will be published in due course. Please keep an eye on this page.
OGONI HEROES’ DAY: CALL FOR ARTICLE SUBMISSION!!!
We are now calling on all Ogoni writers and intellectuals to submit their papers/articles about the Ogoni 9, the struggle and the way forward for Ogoni in preparation for November 10th. Tell the world what actually happened between 1990 and 1995 and even events that occurred before, during and after oil exploration and exploitation in Ogoniland. Your articles will be featured on our news website free of charge and we will ensure they (articles) get to the right audience at the right time. All articles should be submitted toarticles@huraclub.org on/before Nov. 9th 2013. For further enquiries about article submission, concern about this advert, or to contact HURAC, please write to enquiry@huraclub.org or contact us by clicking this link (Opens in new window).
